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INTRODUCTION
The word “Zombie” has its roots in the Haitian French language, 
referring to the reanimation of the human corpse.1 “Zombie” has become 
ubiquitous in American popular culture; zombies seem to be everywhere 
from films, novels, comic books, video games,2 and botnets to tax. Of 
course, science fiction reincarnates zombies as post-human, appearing in 
different forms of the undead through viruses, diseases, and experimental 
accidents, among others. Debates about zombies find no agreement, but 
we can all agree that we know a zombie when we see it, and we don’t like 
what we see.
While a zombie is the undead and has no expiration, patents do. A
patent comes into existence the moment the government, through the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), examines the 
invention application and issues a grant of patent. From that birth, a patent 
will have a lifetime of only twenty years from the date of filing the 
application. Patents expire and have no life after the twenty-year period.
Some patents die when the patentees abandon them by not paying 
maintenance fees. Dead patents must remain dead and become part of the 
                                                                                                                     
* Gerald L. Bepko Chair in Law & Director, Center for Intellectual Property & 
Innovation, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law; Former IP Associate, Fried 
Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson (NYC) and Pryor Cashman Sherman & Flynn (NYC). Special 
thanks to Erik Darwin Hille and Khai-Leif Nguyen-Hille for their love, patience, and support. 
Copyright 2016.
1. Adam Chodorow, Death and Taxes and Zombies, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1210–11
(2013) (discussing “zombie” origin and meanings).
2. See, e.g., BETTER OFF DEAD: THE EVOLUTION OF THE ZOMBIE AS POST-HUMAN (Deborah 
Christie & Sarah Juliet Lauro eds., 2011); KYLE WILLIAM BISHOP, AMERICAN ZOMBIE GOTHIC:
THE RISE AND FALL (AND RISE) OF THE WALKING DEAD IN POPULAR CULTURE (2010); GENERATION 
ZOMBIE: ESSAYS ON THE LIVING DEAD IN MODERN CULTURE (Stephanie Boluk & Wylie Lenz eds., 
2011).
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public domain. Unfortunately, this Essay observes that dead patents are 
not dead. Recent statutory amendments, and U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit decisions, allow dead patents to become undead, 
haunting the living businesses, as seen in Parts I and II, respectively.
Notably, the Federal Circuit’s trio of cases has judicially prolonged 
zombie patents by wrongly eliminating any pathway to challenge 
improper revivals of dead patents or to raise improper revival as a defense 
in patent infringement actions. In addition, there is a zombification 
process that some drug companies have employed on certain patents at 
the expense of the consuming public, as Part III describes. Along with 
zombie patents, some companies that were thought to be dead have now 
resurfaced with patent portfolios to frighten others, as Part IV illustrates.
Zombie patents and zombie companies with patents raise serious 
questions about what patents are, what patents should be, and whether 
patents have strayed too far from the constitutional vision of patents, 
which is to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.3
I. STATUTORILY CREATED ZOMBIE PATENTS
Congress passed the Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act
(PLTIA)4 to ensure that federal patent law harmonizes with provisions of 
the Patent Law Treaty. Specifically, the provisions purport to streamline 
formal procedures for filing and processing patent applications. The 
PLTIA, however, has made a drastic change to the patent statute reviving 
abandoned patents and patent applications.
The new law allows patents expired, due to a patentee’s failure to pay 
maintenance fees, to be revived.5 The statutory change removes the 
twenty-four-month period, allowing such dead patents to be revived at 
any time, as long as the patentee submits a statement that the patentee’s 
failure to pay maintenance fees was unintentional.6 Not only has the time 
period been removed, the new law also deleted the stringent 
“unavoidable” and allowed the lenient “unintentional” delay.7 In other 
words, dead patents become undead, which terrifies businesses that have 
relied on the patents being dead and exposes them to potential dire 
consequences and uncertainty. In addition to the rebirth of dead patents, 
dead patent applications enjoy the same privilege. Under Section 27 of 
                                                                                                                     
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
4. Pub. L. No. 112-211, 126 Stat. 1527 (2013) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 35 U.S.C.).
5. Id.; see also Patent Law Treaty, USPTO (Oct. 29, 2014, 4:38 PM), 
http://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/patent-law-treaty.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(1) (2012).
7. Glycobiosciences, Inc. v. Innocutis Holdings, LLC, No. 12-1901 (RDM), 2015 WL 
3609343, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 2015).
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the patent statute and relevant regulation, if dead patent applications were 
abandoned unintentionally due to failure to file a timely response to the 
USPTO’s action, they can be revived at any time.8
Like zombies wreaking havoc on the living, the statutorily created 
zombie patents have consequences on businesses with technology 
practices covering the invention claimed in the once-abandoned but now-
revived patents or patent applications.9 The businesses do not receive 
much comfort, although they can attempt to rely on the pre-existing 
intervening rights provision of 35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(2).10
II. JUDICIALLY PROLONGED ZOMBIE PATENTS
If businesses seek assistance from the court to kill off zombie patents 
revived by the new law, there is no magic solution. The Federal Circuit’s
recent decisions related to zombie patents are dreadfully frightening to 
businesses. In three decisions, the Federal Circuit held that erroneous 
revival of zombie patents is not available as an invalidity defense or
unenforceability defense in patent infringement actions or third party 
challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).11
In Network Signatures, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance,12 the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) obtained a patent 
pertaining to internet security and intentionally allowed the patent to 
expire by not paying the 7.5 year maintenance fee due to lack of 
commercial interest from third parties on the patent.13 Two weeks after 
the final payment date, NRL received an inquiry from Network 
Signatures about licensing the patent.14 NRL then filed a petition with the 
USPTO for the delayed payment of the maintenance fee, along with a 
statement that the delay was “unintentional.”15 The USPTO approved the 
delayed payment and NRL licensed the revived patent to Network 
Signatures.16 Seven years later, Network Signatures brought an 
infringement suit against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company.17 State Farm asserted that NRL committed inequitable conduct 
                                                                                                                     
8. 35 U.S.C. § 27; 37 C.F.R. § 1.137 (2015).
9. John Griem, Jr. & Theodore Y. McDonough, Zombie Patents: Stronger Than Ever,
CARTER LEDYARD & MILBURN LLP, (May 14, 2014), http://www.clm.com/publication.
cfm?ID=489 (noting the harms Zombie patents inflict on businesses).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(2).
11. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.).
12. 731 F.3d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
13. Id. at 1240–41.
14. Id. at 1241.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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in petitioning the USPTO because the delay was intentional and NRL 
paid the fee after Network Signatures contacted NRL for the license.18
State Farm moved for summary judgment of the unenforceability of the 
patent.19 The district court found for State Farm on the unenforceability 
defense of the patent’s improper revival.20 On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
reversed, stating that NRL’s conduct did not constitute material 
misrepresentation with intent to deceive the USPTO.21 The Federal 
Circuit declined to second-guess the USPTO’s decision on the present 
matter as it was unrelated to the substantive criteria of patentability and 
within the USPTO’s authority.22
In Aristocrat Technologies Austria PTY Ltd. v. International Game 
Technologies,23 the Federal Circuit held that a patent application’s
improper revival after abandonment was not an invalidity defense in a 
patent infringement action.24 In that case, Aristocrat competed in the 
market for electronic gaming machines against International Game 
Technologies (IGT).25 Aristocrat filed a Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) 
application in Australia on July 8, 1997.26 Aristocrat was required to pay 
the fee for the U.S. national stage of the PCT application by January 10, 
2000, thirty months after the first filing, to claim priority.27 The USPTO 
received Aristocrat’s national filing fee on January 11, 2000, and issued 
a notice of abandonment to Aristocrat, which stated that Aristocrat may 
consider a petition to the Commissioner for a revival.28 Instead of filing 
such a petition, Aristocrat filed a Petition to Correct the Date, i.e. to 
correct the date on which the USPTO received the national filing fee.29
Aristocrat, however, did not submit sufficient evidence to corroborate the 
date the filing fee was mailed, and the USPTO denied the petition.30
Later, Aristocrat filed a petition to revive the patent application, claiming 
that its failure to timely pay the national state filing fee was 
“unintentional.”31 The USPTO granted the petition to revive on 
                                                                                                                     
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1242.
21. Id. at 1242–43.
22. Id. at 1243–44.
23. 543 F.3d 657 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
24. Id. at 661.
25. Id. at 659.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 659–60.
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September 3, 2002.32 When the USPTO later granted a patent on the 
application, Aristocrat brought an infringement action against IGT.33 IGT 
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the patent was invalid 
because after the patent application abandonment, Aristocrat was 
required to show that its delay was “unavoidable,” but was permitted to 
show its delay was “unintentional” by the PTO. The district court ruled 
in favor of IGT.34 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, ruling that 
“‘improper revival’ is not a cognizable defense in an action involving the 
validity or infringement of a patent.”35 The Federal Circuit relied on 
various sections of the patent statute and found Congress did not intend 
the statute to have a defense pertaining to revival of an abandoned 
application.36 The Federal Circuit flatly rejected IGT’s argument.
As well as eliminating the availability of unenforceability and 
invalidity defenses, the Federal Circuit has allowed zombie patents to 
proliferate by shutting down a third-party collateral challenge to the 
USPTO’s improper revival decision. In Exela Pharma Sciences, LLC v. 
Lee,37 SCR Pharmatop filed its original patent application in France on 
June 6, 2000, and filed an international patent application identifying the 
United States as the designated state under the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty.38 SCR Pharmatop had thirty months after the original filing to 
submit required documents for the U.S. application.39 The deadline was 
December 6, 2002, and SCR Pharmatop did not submit the documents
and the application was deemed abandoned.40 Almost a month later, on 
January 2, 2003, SCR Pharmatop filed a petition to revive the abandoned 
application on the ground of “unintentional” delay.41 The USPTO granted 
the petition on April 25, 2003.42 The patent application was subsequently 
granted on January 31, 2006.43 Five years later, in August 2011, SCR 
Pharmatop and its exclusive sublicensee brought a patent infringement 
suit against Excela.44 In light of the Aristocrat decision, without the 
availability of asserting the invalidity defense, Excela filed a petition in 
the USPTO under the APA to challenge the USPTO’s revival of the 
                                                                                                                     
32. Id. at 660.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 659.
36. Id. at 662–63.
37. 781 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
38. Id. at 1350.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1350–51.
41. Id. at 1351.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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patent application that led to the patent at issue.45 The USPTO rejected 
Excela’s petition, stating that no statute authorizes a third-party challenge 
to a USPTO decision concerning revival of a patent application.46 Excela 
then filed an action under the APA in the district court requesting the 
court to compel the USPTO to vacate its revival decision.47 The district 
court denied and Excela appealed to the Federal Circuit.48 Framing the 
question for consideration as “whether a third party may collaterally 
challenge and obtain judicial review of a USPTO revival ruling 
concerning an unrelated patent application,” the Federal Circuit swiftly 
decided in the negative.49 The Federal Circuit explained that the structure 
of the Patent Act dictates that “third party challenge of USPTO revival 
rulings under the APA is not legislatively intended.”50
The trio, Network Signatures, Aristocrat and Excela, is troublesome.
Under Network Signatures and Aristocrat, defendants in patent 
infringement cases are not allowed to assert unenforceability and 
invalidity defenses when patentees’ conduct of abandoning the patents 
and patent applications is in question. The justification for the bar is the 
Federal Circuit’s reading of the Patent Act to mean that the statute’s
grounds for challenges to issued patents do not include USPTO’s revival 
of abandoned application decisions.51 That means the defendants must 
turn to the only available route to review the USPTO’s decision, the APA, 
because there is a “strong presumption that Congress intends judicial 
review of administrative action.”52 But the Excela decision shut down 
APA review brought by defendants-turned-third party.53 The trio of cases 
leaves no room to challenge zombie patents.
While the Federal Circuit is correct in holding that the structure of the 
Patent Act’s “intricate scheme for administrative and judicial review of 
USPTO patentability determination[],” and “the Patent Act’s careful 
framework for judicial review at the behest of particular persons through 
particular procedures” bar third-party APA challenges to patent validity 
based on the USPTO’s improper revival of an abandoned patent 
application,54 the Federal Circuit ignores the fact that its decisions expose 
a glaring inconsistency in the statutory scheme of the Patent Act and the 
                                                                                                                     
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1352.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1353.
50. Id.
51. Id. (Newman, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 1354 (Dyk, J., concurring) (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 
476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)).
53. Id. at 1350 (per curiam).
54. Id. at 1353 (quoting Pregis Corp. v. Kappos, 700 F.3d 1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
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APA review. The Patent Act permits third-party challenges to patent 
invalidity in only two ways: as defenses to patent infringement actions in 
the district court or as challenges brought at the USPTO in inter partes
review, post grant review, or inter partes reexamination.55 Under 
Aristocrat, the Federal Circuit interpreted the Patent Act to bar an 
invalidity defense based on improper revival of an abandoned patent, and 
under Excela, the Federal Circuit interpreted the Patent Act to bar APA 
review of a USPTO decision on improper revival of an abandoned patent 
application. Consequently, Judge Timothy Dyk exposed this
inconsistency in his concurring opinion in Excela when he stated that the 
Patent Act’s “statutory scheme is inconsistent with [third-party] APA 
review . . . in the district court.”56 That cannot be the result, and the culprit 
for causing the inconsistency is the Federal Circuit’s Aristocrat decision.
Judge Dyk explained that the Aristocrat decision is “problematic” and 
urged the Federal Circuit to have an en banc action to reconsider 
Aristocrat for four reasons.57 First, because the Excela holding denies 
APA review for improper revivals of abandoned patent application and 
because there is no alternative review, the invalidity defense would be the 
only route available for judicial review.58 Aristocrat blocks the defense, 
incorrectly. Second, Aristocrat treats abandoned patents matter as minor 
procedural error.59 To the contrary, the abandoned patents matter is 
important because Congress has considered the gravity of the matter and 
allowed the USPTO to reinstate the patent only when specific criteria 
were satisfied.60 Third, Aristocrat fails to reconcile “why a third party 
facing liability for infringement of the patent cannot seek judicial review 
of a revival decision if the patent applicant can do so” under the Federal 
Circuit’s prior precedent.61 Lastly, Aristocrat fails to recognize that there 
are many judicially created defenses to patent infringement.62 The Patent 
Act does not list these defenses.63 These defenses “cannot be so easily 
distinguished from” the improper revival of the abandoned patent 
invalidity defense asserted in Aristocrat.64
In summary, Aristocrat is wrong to block the invalidity defense when 
there is no avenue of review available. Aristocrat causes the Patent Act 
to be inconsistent with third-party APA review. If a future court 
reconsiders Aristocrat in an en banc decision and declares it incorrect, the 
                                                                                                                     
55. Id. at 1354 (Dyk, J., concurring).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1355.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1356.
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invalidity defense based on an improper revival of abandoned patent 
could be available in infringement actions. That will ensure that the
Patent Act’s statutory scheme for third-party challenges to patent 
invalidity is consistent with the APA. As Aristocrat still stands, zombie 
patents continue to be undead, because defendants in patent infringement 
actions are blocked from raising an invalidity defense.
III. ZOMBIE PATENTS AND “EVERGREENING”
On one spectrum, drug companies have been accused of manipulating 
the patent system to create zombie patents by “extending the lifespan of 
patents, at consumers’ expense.”65 Specifically, drug companies can seek 
to patent a closely related compound when the original patented 
compound is to expire and devote a significant marketing campaign to 
shift the consumers to the new patented drug.66 This type of patent 
zombification has another name, “evergreening.”67 Also, drug companies 
attempt to lengthen the lifespan of a patent by creating a demand for the 
once-patented drug through brand-specific demand.68 For example, the 
drug company for ibuprofen strategically created Nurofen, or branded 
ibuprofen, in 1983, the year before the patent for ibuprofen expired.69
Nurofen came to the market in 2006 and became lucrative for the 
company, as Nurofen costs five times more than generics.70
                                                                                                                     
65. Zombie Patents: Drug Companies Are Adept at Extending the Lifespan of Patents, at 
Consumers’ Expense, ECONOMIST (June 21, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-
and-economics/21604575-drug-companies-are-adept-extending-lifespan-patents-consumers
[hereinafter Zombie Patents].
66. Id. (reporting that in addition to a “chemical tinkering” strategy, drug companies also 
pay makers of generics not to compete through “pay for delay” agreements); see also 21st Century 
Cures: Examining the Role of Incentives in Advancing Treatments and Cures for Patients:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong.
5 (2014) (statement of C. Scott Hemphill, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School) (explaining 
the problems of evergreening patents and “product hopping,” where drug companies have the 
incentive “to shift patients and doctors to a line extension before generic entry occurs” by 
promoting the new product).
67. Stephen Shepherd, Patent Necromancy or Domestic and Foreign Treatment of 
Patentability and Infringement Concerning Pharmaceutical Salts and Polymorphs, HEAD,
JOHNSON & KACHIGIAN, PC, https://www.hjkwlaw.com/single-post/2015/02/18/Patent-
Necromancy---or---Domestic-and-Foreign-Treatment-of-Patentability-and-Infringement-
Concerning-Pharmaceutical-Salts-and-Polymorphs (last visited Apr. 5, 2017) (stating that 
“‘evergreening,’ is the term generally applied to pharmaceutical companies’ attempts to use 
continuing research to maintain and extend patent protection on previously developed drug 
lines”).
68. Zombie Patents, supra note 65.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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IV. ZOMBIE COMPANIES WITH PATENTS
On the other spectrum, in the tech industry, companies whose business 
collapsed in the face of fierce competition have resurfaced with their 
patent portfolios as a new weapon. For example, Lycos was a pioneer 
search engine company in the internet’s early days because it was the first 
search company to implement spider web indexing.71 In the dotcom boom 
peak year of 2000, Lycos was sold to Terra Networks for $12.5 billion.72
Lycos faced death when Google launched its ad program for searches that 
align the interests of the advertiser and the user.73 By 2010, Lycos was 
sold again—to an India-based company, Ybrant Digital—and this time 
the price tag was a meager $36 million.74 With its search business 
evaporated, most thought Lycos was dead in the marketplace.75 Recently, 
Lycos has resurfaced like a zombie “for one last breath” solely for the 
purpose of selling its patent portfolios.76 The reason for the zombie’s
resurrection has much to do with the zombie’s patents, as they are viewed 
as potent weapons that can be utilized either as offensive weapons to 
“extract licensing fees or litigation victories against alleged infringers” or
as defensive weapons for “a potential ‘mutually assured destruction’
deterrent or to preemptively remove them from potential adversaries’
arsenals.”77 Using euphemistic phrases, Lycos unleashed its news release 
about its repurposed patents “in an effort to foster a collaborative and 
mutually beneficial relationship with partners and industries.”78 Overall, 
Lycos can be a zombie because of its patent portfolio ranging from search 
engine technology, to online advertising, to online gaming.79 In reality, 
                                                                                                                     
71. Andrew Tarantola, 90s Web Portal Lycos Returns to Sell Its Patents, ENGADGET (May 
20, 2015), http://www.engadget.com/2015/05/20/lycos-selling-patent-portfolio.
72. Duncan Riley, Lycos Is Looking to Sell Its Search Patents, and Yes, Lycos Still Exists,
SILICONANGLE (May 21, 2015), http://siliconangle.com/blog/2015/05/21/lycos-is-looking-to-
sell-its-search-patents-and-yes-lycos-still-exists.
73. Jim Gilliam, How Lycos Almost Won the Search Engine Wars, GIZMODO (July
22, 2015), http://gizmodo.com/how-lycos-almost-won-the-search-engine-wars-1719546124
(recounting the race to conquer the internet search’s ultracompetitive environment). 
74. Curt Woodward, Internet Search Pioneer Lycos Puts Patents up for Sale, BETA BOS.
(May 20, 2015), http://www.betaboston.com/news/2015/05/20/internet-search-pioneer-lycos-
puts-patents-up-for-sale (discussing Lycos’s fate from early stage to present time).
75. Matthew S. Yungwirth & John R. Gibson, Zombie Companies: When Businesses Die, 
Their Patents Live On, DUANE MORRIS (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.duanemorris.com/
articles/zombie_companies_when_businesses_die_their_patents_live_on_at_issue_10089.html
(describing Lycos’s recent return to sell its patents).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Woodward, supra note 74.
79. Press Release, Lycos, Lycos Puts Its Stable of Innovative IP Patents up for Sale (May 
21, 2015), http://corp.lycos.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Lycos-Patent.pdf.
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Lycos has been waiting for the optimal time with “hopes of gaining 
entitlement for IP external innovation.”80
Lycos, as others note, is not the only zombie company. Nortel, dead 
in bankruptcy, extended its death hands through its patent portfolio.
Motorola was slowly killed into two parts,81 and Motorola Mobility, the 
part with the patent portfolio, was purchased by Google for the price tag 
of $12.5 billion for its defensive purpose of protecting its “Android 
ecosystem.”82
CONCLUSION
It is time that the Federal Circuit stop prolonging zombie patents. 
Zombie patents and zombie companies with patents are the latest signs
that patents can serve as corporate weapons that inflict harm and increase 
costs, rather than as legal protection for innovations, in accordance with
the constitutional vision of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”83
                                                                                                                     
80. Id.
81. Ted C. Fishman, What Happened to Motorola, CHI. MAG. (Aug. 25, 2014, 11:50 AM), 
http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/September-2014/What-Happened-to-Motorola
(reporting that Motorola was finally divided into two companies in 2011, “the cleaving of 
Motorola Mobility (the mobile phone company) from Motorola Solutions (the public safety and 
enterprise company),” and that Google’s purchase of Motorola Mobility was for patent reasons).
82. Yungwirth & Gibson, supra note 75.
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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